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In 1959, General Dynamics acquired Material Services. Acquiring Material Services
turned General Dynamics into the nation’s sixth largest coal producer and the largest
producer in the Midwest. Such a status was made possible by Material Services’ two
recent acquisitions, United Electric and Freeman Coal.
In 1967, the Department of Justice (DOJ) launched an attack against General Dynamics.
The foundation of the attack was that General Dynamics had, according to the DOJ,
helped to further the concentration of the coal industry in both the Eastern Interior Coal
Province1 (or the EICP) and the State of Illinois. The case was brought to the District
Court that ruled ultimately in favor of General Dynamics. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, in 1974, a ruling was handed down that vindicated the actions of General
Dynamics and dismissed the arguments proffered by the DOJ.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the reasons behind Material Services’
acquisitions, the reasons why the Government contested the mergers, and how the
Government erred in analyzing the case. We wish to show that the combination of the
three coal firms—Material Services, Freeman Coal, and United Electric—occurred for
reasons of economic efficiency and practicality, not based on any atavistic desire to
monopolize and damage social welfare.
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This paper is divided into 7 sections. Section I shall provide a brief history of General
Dynamics and of Material Services. Section II shall briefly discuss the DOJ’s merger
guidelines. Section III will discuss the DOJ’s criticisms of Material Services’ acquisition
of the two other coal companies, and will briefly discuss General Dynamics’ defense.
Section IV will analyze the shortcomings of industry-concentration analysis. Section V
will demonstrate how functional was applied to this case. Section VI will discuss the
benefits of the acquisition of Freeman Coal and United Electric. Section VII will discuss
the Court’s response to the DOJ’s arguments. The lasting impact of General Dynamics
will also be considered.
Section I. General Dynamics and Material Services.
General Dynamics has been operating since the turn of the century. That firm has
historically been a well-diversified, multi-product company. Aircraft, communications,
and marine products have been the longest running product lines. The company’s largest
purchaser is the Federal Government. More recently, the company has expanded into the
telecommunications and computer software fields.
Material Services is considerably smaller than General Dynamics. The former is
engaged in producing and supplying building materials. Material Services also operates
coalfields in the Midwest region. In the 1950s and 1960s, the company undertook the
acquisition of two companies engaged in the extraction of coal. Freeman Coal and United
Electric were acquired, in part or in whole, by Material Services. Freeman Coal was
engaged predominantly in underground mining, and United Electric operated many strip
mines in Illinois. The benefits of these horizontal mergers are discussed in Section VI.
In 1959, General Dynamics acquired Material Services. Being two corporations
having wholly different product lines, the acquisition of Material Services can be best
described as conglomerate. General Dynamics’ purchase of Material Services was a part
of a diversification program "aimed at expanding…into commercial, nondefense lines"
(Posner 426). Seven years later, General Dynamics tendered an offer to purchase the
outstanding shares of United Electric. The offer was successful and the acquisition of
United Electric under General Dynamics had been made complete. In 1969, the DOJ
contested General Dynamics’ acquisition of United Electric, a process which had begun
under Material Services’ directorship, and turned General Dynamics into the largest coalproducing firm in the Midwest.
Section II. DOJ’s 1968 Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers.
The DOJ has adopted many guidelines over the decades to provide a framework
for identifying those firms whose actions both violate the Sherman Act (and the
amending Clayton and Cellar-Kefauver Acts), and, as a consequence, necessitate the
response of the DOJ. The case against General Dynamics falls under the 1968
Guidelines. This section shall provide a brief introduction to those guidelines.
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Horizontal mergers between firms may carry many benefits. The most obvious are
the synergies that are generated by combining the production processes of two or more
firms (Walters 218). As a result of a merger, costs may be minimized, greater resources
may be allocated to research, and the levels of technical skills of both firms may be
raised.
The benefits of such merger activity may be negated if the combination
concentrates a market to such an extent that competition is lessened and consumer
welfare declines. The DOJ’s criticisms of horizontal mergers in concentrating markets are
that merged firms may not face the degree of competition as they had hitherto been
subject. As a result of decreasing competition, the larger, postmerged firm may be
disinclined to operate as efficiently. If firms are able to do so without a contrary response
by their competitors, firms may cut output and raise prices. This would effectively erode
consumer welfare. The DOJ also contests horizontal mergers between firms whose
combination tends to increase market concentration.
The DOJ will contest mergers if they fall within certain parameters. For example,
in markets where the shares of the four largest firms are equal or in excess of 75%, the
merger will be contested (Thompson 184). A much more comprehensive look at the
parameters for horizontal mergers is available in Thompson’s "Text, Cases, and Materials
on Antitrust Fundamentals."
One aspect of the DOJ’s guidelines that will be touched on more broadly concerns
the issue of synergies. According to Thompson, the DOJ will not refuse to challenge a
merger merely on the grounds that such a combination produces synergies (185). The
reasons for this are that synergies are difficult to measure, and also because the synergies
that a combination can generate may be producible within the individual firm itself. This
is of great importance because the combination of Freeman Coal and United Electric
under Material Services generated numerous synergies, as will be mentioned in Section
VI.
One of the key elements of General Dynamics was the use of functional analysis
of the merging companies and the conditions of the industry the companies were engaged
(Stelzer 170). According to Rogowsky, the Court considers the probable effects of the
merger, the history of the industry, the structure of the market, the financial conditions of
the companies involved, and, most importantly, the creation of any efficiencies (148).
Rogowsky writes, "[t]he Guidelines have not been ignored by the judiciary, but they have
certainly not been binding" (148). The use of functional analysis by the courts dispel
immediately with the notion that the merging of two or more firms, whether or not they
meet the criteria established by the DOJ, will be ruled per se illegal. In Brown Shoe, the
Court maintained that:
"Statistics reflecting the shares of the market controlled by the
industry
leaders and the parties to the merger are, of course, the
primary index of market
power; but only a further examination of
the particular market—its structure, history,
4
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and probable future— can provide the appropriate setting for judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the merger" (Kitt 266).
It should be noted, however, that the use of functional analysis began with
Brown Shoe, which predates General Dynamics.
Section III. DOJ’s Criticisms of Material Service’s Acquisition of
Freeman
Coal and United Electric, and the Insufficiency of
Concentration Ratios
The DOJ followed in the history of United States v. Aluminum Company of
America (1964) by asserting that ‘"if concentration is already great, the importance of
preventing even slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of
eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great"’ (Moyer 19). The DOJ, thus, charged
that the acquisition of United Electric, initiated by Material Services and finalized under
General Dynamics, had further induced concentration in the coal industry in the Eastern
Interior Coal Province (Stelzer 168). The DOJ demonstrated, in the relevant geographic
market, the total number of coal companies had decreased. Also, coal had been shown to
be a market, which lacked interfuel competition. In addition, the DOJ provided evidence
that a small concentration of firms were taking a commanding lead in the production of
coal. Table I illustrates this last point.
Table I
Concentration of the Coal Industry
In the Eastern Interior Coal Province
And Illinois
Eastern Coal Province

Illinois

1957

1967

1957

1967

Top 2 Firms

29.6

48.6

37.8

52.9

Top 4 Firms

43.0

62.9

54.5

75.2

Top 10 Firms

65.5

91.4

84.0

98.0

Thompson, George. Text, Cases, and Materials on Antitrust Fundamentals. Pp. 182.

The DOJ charged General Dynamics with encouraging the concentration of the coal
industry in the Midwest. Even though General Dynamics had not been charged with any
violation of conduct such as price discrimination or price gouging, the mere change in the
structure of the industry sufficed to warrant prosecution.
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Under attack by the DOJ, General Dynamics proffered several arguments to counter the
DOJ’s claims. This section will summarize the defense of General Dynamics.
First, General Dynamics maintained that United Electric’s coal reserves had been
decreasing several years prior to the start of the case. The majority of United Electric’s
reserves had already been committed to electric utilities under long-term contracts. The
amount of reserves available for sale in the spot market amounted to 1% in the
geographic market established by the DOJ. This caused United to be an inept competitor
with diminishing ability to disrupt the market by undercutting price and quantity.
Second, because United’s coal reserves were facing eventual exhaustion (the useful life
of United’s reserves was estimated to last until 1991), General Dynamics maintained that
the acquisition of United was legitimate and acceptable under the failing firm doctrine
(Moyer 13). This argument would later be rejected by both the District and the Supreme
Court, both of which took notice of the fact that United, despite diminishing reserves,
was till "highly profitable" (Kitt 268).
Third, General Dynamics maintained that the relevant product market had been too
narrowly defined to the point that several energy substitutes had been excluded. This will
be discussed in greater detail in the next section.
We shall now examine how the courts viewed the charges of the DOJ against General
Dynamics.
Section IV. The Insufficiency of the DOJ’s Charges.
At first glance, the concentration ratios proffered by the DOJ demonstrated that the
market was severely concentrated. However, the use of concentration ratios cannot be
applied to every industry and reflect a realistic image of an industry’s current state and
structure. According to Richard Gordon, "When the market involves competition among
somewhat different goods such as different types of fuels, coals, computers, or packaging
materials, share measures cannot be used satisfactorily" (33). Concentration ratios rest on
the assumptions that the relevant geographic market has properly been identified, that the
relevant product market has properly been identified, and that a company’s total sales
reflect that company’s market power.
We shall demonstrate that all three of the findings of the DOJ were inadequately
reached. We shall provide both the findings of the District Court and the Supreme Court,
as well as new evidence.
First, on the issue of the relevant geographic market, both courts agreed with the
DOJ that the Eastern Interior Coal Province and the State of Illinois were the relevant
markets for the sale of coal. This market had been named by the Geological Survey when
mapping U.S. coal reserves (Stelzer 168). The market delineation was further
strengthened by the fact that coal imported into the EICP was priced as much as 40%
higher than coal produced within. However, according to Elizinga and Hogarty, "[p]rice
6
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data generally are not going to be adequate to use in delineating geographic market
boundaries" (7).
A LIFO/LOFI test, conducted in 1978 by Elizinga and Hogarty, weakens the DOJ’s
argument that the EICP was the relevant geographic market. To discover what was the
relevant market, Elizinga and Hogarty took the aggregate coal used by each state, and set
out to find the source of the coal. In their findings, almost 30% of all of the coal used in
Illinois were imported from companies operating in the Rocky Mountain States, none of
which are germane to the EICP. Also, Missouri imported 50% of that state’s coal from
the western states. In addition, Kentucky imported 60.3% from the Appalachian
coalfields (16). Clearly, the geographic scope of the coal market was larger than the
EICP.
We shall now consider the relevant product market. As has been mentioned, coal was
increasingly being consumed by the electrical utilities, who were quickly becoming the
largest consumers of coal in the nation. Other consumers included cement companies and
railroads, both of which consumed infinitesimal amounts compared to the utilities
(Stelzer 175).
The DOJ maintained that coal was a market of energy unto itself (Kitt 272). This was
because businesses that used coal in their production processes were not necessarily able
to substitute to other fuels. Both the District Court and the Supreme Court disagreed
vehemently with this view. On the issue of interbrand competition, the Supreme Court
noted that the findings of Continental Can "compel this Court to conclude that since coal
competes with gas, oil, uranium, and other forms of energy, the relevant line of
commerce must encompass interfuel competition" (Stelzer 174, Slade 94). The effect of
including other fuels into the relevant product market would decrease substantially the
importance of concentration in the coal industry and the ratios that reflect it.
We should amend this section by adding that electric firms relied upon a variety of fuels
to generate electricity. Even though coal was increasingly becoming the mainstay of the
electrical industry, it should be noted that higher prices in the coal market quickly met
with raising price sensitivity (Moyer 11). According to Mann, "[t]here does exist longterm factor substitution of coal for oil or natural gas" (Stelzer 35). The reverse was also
true.
The third assumption behind the use of concentration ratios is that they reflect the market
power of a firm. The combination of Material Services, Freeman Coal, and United
Electric created the largest coal producing entity in the EICP (Kitt 265). This was
inferred from the sales that those three firms enjoyed. The DOJ, however, erred in its
findings that the united firm (under the hegemony of General Dynamics) constituted a
threat to consumers either in the EICP or in Illinois.
Both Material Services and Freeman Coal enjoyed long-lasting reserves. United Electric,
on the other hand, suffered from inadequate reserves. The majority of United’s coal was
committed to fulfilling that company’s long-term contracts with Commonwealth Edison
7
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and others. United’s uncommitted reserves (those that could be sold in the spot market)
amounted to 1% of the unmined coal in the EICP. Long-term contracts constrained
United from effectively competing for other such contracts until the existing ones expired
(most of which expired in 1991). Statistics of production figures proffered by the DOJ
could only imply that that company was successfully fulfilling the existing commitments
of the firm. Such figures suggested very little about the competitiveness outside of
United’s commitments.
The DOJ, when litigation reached the Supreme Court, accepted that United was facing
exhaustion of its coal reserves. However, the DOJ maintained that United, like many
other firms, could, at any time, acquire the technology to uncover new reserves, thus
increasing that firm’s total reserves. In court, General Dynamics successfully countered
this attack by presenting many witnesses who testified that General Dynamics had
financially assisted United in attempting to find new coal reserves on land owned by the
latter. This demonstrated that United had no means of expanding its operations given its
present amount of land.
Despite the lack of success, assisting United Electric in uncovering new coal reserves was
logical for two reasons. Firstly, existing legislation requiring coal firms to return land to
its "natural state" would have been an expense whose occurrence could be delayed by
uncovering new reserves. Secondly, after the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969 (mentioned below), labor pro-ductivity in underground mining
operations fell greatly. Other reasons also made underground mining unattractive to the
coal industry.2 For these reasons, General Dynamics was inclined to assist United Electric
in finding new reserves. The Court ruled that United Electric might or might not procure
additional reserves in the future. However, the mere possibility of this occurring was
deemed irrelevant to the case by the courts (Stelzer 269).
We shall now examine how functional analysis was applied to the case and how the
courts reached its conclusion in favor of General Dynamics. This requires an intimate at
both the coal industry and the companies involved in the acquisition.
Section V. An industry in Consolidation.
The acquisition of United Electric and Freeman Coal was not an attempt on the
part of Material Services to gain market power over the coal industry. To understand the
reasons behind the acquisition and to assess the probable effects of the acquisition
requires the use of functional analysis. Functional analysis differs from industryconcentration analysis in that the latter does not consider the trends of the industry or of
the economy. Functional analysis takes these elements into consideration. Therefore, we
must examine the coal industry, not just the litigants.
This section will attempt to explore some of the reasons why the coal industry was
undergoing tremendous consolidation in the postwar era. The following table illustrates
the concentration of the coal industry during the postwar years from 1950 to 1965.
8
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

Table II.
National Coal Production Concentration Ratios
Year

4-FIRM

8-FIRM

20-FIRM

1950

13.6

19.4

30.4

1955

17.8

25.5

39.6

1960

21.4

30.5

44.5

1965

26.6

36.3

50.1

Chakravarthy, Balaji. Managing Coal: A Challenge in Adaptation. Pp. 42.

There were three reasons why the coal industry underwent consolidation during
this period. Firstly, in the 1950s, there began a resurgence of demand for coal. This point
shall be focused upon more intensely. Secondly, labor productivity was increasing in both
underground and deep-shaft mining. Thirdly, the coal industry, prior to the environmental
regulation of the 1970s, involved little economic and political risk.
By 1970, the electrical utility industry was consuming two-thirds of all extracted coal
(Kitt 266). This contrasted sharply to the 13% that utilities had been demanding in 1946
(Table III). The increasing demand of the electric utilities was offset by the continually
falling demand of the railroads that substituted away to diesel fuel (Chakravarthy 37). In
1946, the railroads were responsible for consuming one-fifth of all coal produced. This
fell dramatically by 1960 when railroads consumed less than one percent of national coal
output (Mann 6).
Table III.
Electric Utilities’ Demand for Coal 1946-1970
Year

Coal in Thousand Tons

1946

68,743

1947

86,009

1950

88,262

1955

140,550

1960

173,882
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1965

242,729

1970

318,921

Gordon, Richard L. Coal in the U.S. Energy Market.

Pp. 25.

As the primary purchasers of coal changed from the railroad industry to the electric utility
industry, the conditions of the market also changed dramatically. During the 1930s and
1940s, substantial amounts of coal were sold in the spot market by smaller "truck" mines.
Production did not require rigorous schedules and quotas. Coal producers could sell coal
to prospective purchasers at the mine itself or would sell to purchasing agents who would
transship coal via waterway to other marketplaces. With the advent of the 1950s and
1960s, these characteristics would quickly vanish as coal output was placed under longterm contracts to meet the demand of large industrial users.
Utilities demanded that coal production be reliable and continuous (Chakravarthy 45).
This was necessary in order to perform on the contracts that had been signed between the
utilities and the coal companies. The preference for long-term contracts among utilities
had two important consequences for coal producers. The first of these was the need for
more labor to insure that coal production reached the amounts needed. This meant hiring
coal workers who were younger than the average miner and often relatively
inexperienced. A tightening in the labor market resulted with the expected increases in
wages (Mann 66).
The second consequence that long-term contracts had on the coal industry was the need
for larger reserves (Chakravarthy 51). Utilities would often agree to contract with those
coal companies that had a supply of reserves well above the amounts specified under the
desired contract. Because coal reserves could only be estimated and not stated with
complete accuracy, those companies that enjoyed excess reserves were the preferred
suppliers and often won the contract. By contracting with a coal producer whose reserves
were in excess of demand, utilities also hedged against the unfortunate occurrence of a
producer failing to perform on the contract, wishing instead to sell the committed coal,
during times of inflation, at spot market prices that were higher than the contract price
(Mann 76). Having a supply of uncommitted coal allowed the coal producers to meet the
needs of the utilities and to those profits incurred from higher prices in the spot market.
Increasing wages and the need for larger coal reserves led to a merger trend in the coal
industry. The truck mines, numerous in number in Kentucky and the Appalachia,
gradually disappeared (Kitt 273). They merged into larger companies and were often
acquired by oil companies wishing to diversify. Merging together allowed the coal
companies to compete more effectively for long-term contracts. Not only did the size of
the reserves increase, the acquired companies could also take advantage of the parent
company’s technical expertise and capital machinery, which were necessary for expanded
mining operations and distribution.
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The second reason why consolidation occurred in the coal industry was due to the fact
that labor productivity had been increasing for several decades prior to 19693
(Chakravarthy 43-45). This was due to the adoption of labor- and capital-intensive
technology, which reduced significantly the cost of extracting coal. Labor productivity
for the coal industry can be seen in Table IV.
Table IV.
Labor Productivity in the Coal Industry
Year

Underground Mining

Strip Mining

1960

10.64

22.93

1965

14.00

31.98

Chakravarthy, Balaji. Managing Coal: A Challenge in Adaptation. Pp. 43-45.

Third, the business of coal, prior to the environmental regulation of the 1970s, was
neither politically nor economically risky (Gordon 320-21). Government policies towards
coal extraction and production were formulated at the state and local levels. Table V
illustrates the regulations that governed the coal industry. These regulations cannot be
described as burdensome on the industry when compared to the far stricter federally
imposed restrictions suffered by the coal industry of the 1970s.
Table V.
State Regulation of Coal Mining
Procedures to
Obtain
Necessary
Permits

1. Submission of geological and engineering
analyses
2. Submission of plans involving future reclamation
activities
3. Written adherence to states’ regulatory powers
of that industry
4. Posting of bond which would be returned after
reclamation activities are concluded

Enabling
Legislation

1. Establishment of state-wide agencies to monitor
coal operators’ activities
2. Granting authority to regulators to apply
regulations to coal mines

Severance
Taxation

Taxes were levied in order to
1. Compensate the public for the environmental
damage being done through the operation of coal
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mines
2. Receive general revenues.

Randall, Alan. Resource Economics. Pp. 219-220.

Economically, coal like other minerals industries, typically performed better than other
industries. Extractive industries were, and
still are, less risky than other industries when considering market risk.
There are three reasons for this. First, market failure for minerals has
not historically occurred. Second, cyclicality is not a greater concern
than for any other industry. Third, fluctuations are less severe for this
industry than for others (Gordon 320).
Section VI. Benefits of Acquisition.
The horizontal mergers of United Electric and Freeman Coal with Material Services were
symbolic of an overall trend in the coal industry (Schwartz 190). Throughout the nation,
smaller firms were combining to become larger firms. The most typical form of merger
was between an oil company and a coal company (Chakravarthy 51). This allowed the
former to diversify into other areas of the energy industry; the latter benefited by having
access to the enormous financial resources of their parent oil company.
Freeman and United, however, did not complement one another in terms of
production processes and managerial skills. Freeman Coal was engaged in deep-shaft
mining. Deep-shaft mining is capital intensive in nature and employs large amounts of
machinery for several decades. United Electric was strip-mining coal. Strip-mining is
relatively more labor-intensive than deep-shaft. The machinery needed to carry out these
two general forms of extraction differs tremendously. To operate these mines requires
managers whose abilities were not translatable from one type of mining operation to
another (Moyer 9).
The two subsidiaries did complement one another in an interesting way. As
mentioned above, utilities preferred to contract with those companies whose reserves
were in excess of the amount specified in the contract. United’s reserves had been
diminishing throughout the 1960s (Posner 432). This caused United to experience
difficulty in obtaining long-term contracts. When the two companies were brought under
Material Services’ leadership, a portion of Freeman’s reserves was allocated to guarantee
United’s commitments. Thus, through association with Material Services (and, therefore,
with Freeman Coal), the marketability of United’s coal was strengthened, increasing that
firm’s ability to compete for long-term contracts, though only in the short-term.
12
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Another benefit can be seen in regards to Freeman Coal. When Freeman was an
independent company, that firm had limited access to the many utility firms operating in
the Midwest. The range of Freeman’s actual and potential customers was within a
relatively limited range inside of the Eastern Interior Coal Province. Exporting coal
outside of this region was extraordinarily expensive. Freeman and United were not direct
competitors in regards to the many consumers of coal.
Ultimately, when General Dynamics acquired control over Freeman Coal (via
Material Services), the ability of Freeman to supply a growing number of coal consumers
increased demonstrably. The flow of ownership away from Freeman to Material Services
and, then, to General Dynamics had a profound impact on the ability of that firm to
service new clients. This is particularly true in regards to Edison Utilities in the Midwest.
Table VI illustrates the impact that acquisition had on Freeman Coal.

Table VI.
Benefits of Acquisition Over Time
Flow of Ownership

Freeman’s Status
of Ownership

Of Freeman Coal

Freeman is an
independent firm prior
to Material Service’s
stock purchases.

Freeman Coal

Freeman is informally
controlled by Material
Services by 1964.

Freeman’s
Ability to
Service
Commonwealth
Edison
Utilities

Freeman was prevented from
entering certain markets due
to transportation costs.
Entry into new markets for
the sale of coal was
rendered feasible by lowered
transportation costs made
available through
association with Material
Services.

Material Services
Further association of
Freeman Coal and Commonwealth Edison, and other
utilities, on a supplier/
purchaser basis, proceeds.

A majority of Freeman’s
stock is bought by
General Dynamics in
1969.

13
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General Dynamics

To help us summarize this section, we shall construct a Material Capacity (MATCAP)
appraisal of United Electric and Freeman Coal. Such an appraisal involves an
understanding of both firms in terms of their reserves and their access to finance. Both
firms faced different levels of
reserves. United, during the 1970s was depleting its reserves and was
unsuccessfully attempting to uncover new ones. Freeman, on the other
hand, still maintained large amounts of reserves and was not in any danger of exhausting
its mines.
As for access to capital resources, any firm, essentially, has three methods of raising the
capital needed to expand operations and to replace aging capital. Firms can raise capital
through equity, bonds, or allocating internal funds (of the firm itself). Even though the
coal industry was especially lucrative and investors were willing to risk their monies, coal
companies were burdened by increasing interest rates throughout the 1960s. This burden,
though not as severe as was witnessed in the 1970s, decreased the firms’ willingness to
look for capital outside the firm. Financially rich oil companies proved a wonderful
opportunity for many coal companies, many of whom welcomed conglomerate mergers
with the former. United and Freeman had access to the tremendous financial resources of
General Dynamics. This decreased the level of uncertainty regarding future sources of
financing. Based upon the information in the preceding two paragraphs, we can generate
our MATCAP which is shown in the table below.
Table VII.
MATCAP Analysis of Freeman and United
After Acquisition in 1964
Reserves
DeepShaft

Financial Resources

Strip Mining

14
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United Electric

Low

Medium

Abundant

Freeman Coal

Abundant

Low

Abundant

This table illustrates the precarious condition that United Electric was in even
after that firm’s acquisition by General Dynamics. United had been unable to find any
additional reserves, while, at the same time, the useful life of that company’s strip-mines
was decreasing precipitously. The MATCAP appraisal also compares United Electric to
Freeman Coal, who enjoyed far greater reserves and whose potential to generate revenues
was far greater, in the long-term, than United Electric.
The previous two sections have attempted to demonstrate that a) the combination of
United and Freeman was a reflection of an ongoing merger dynamic in the coal industry,
and b) the acquisition of those firms generated economic efficiencies. Only by combining
to form a united company could United Electric receive tremendous access to financial
resources to search for additional coal. As for Freeman Coal, that company benefited
from acquisition by having the market for that company’s coal be widened significantly.
The Court’s observance of these economic efficiencies makes General Dynamics a
landmark case in the history of antitrust.
Section VII. The Court’s Response and the Legacy of General Dynamics
The Supreme Court maintained that the relevant product market had inadequately
been defined by the DOJ. The product market broadened substantially when the Court
allowed other fuels such as oil and natural gas to be included. The Court also refused the
DOJ’s notion that United Electric would, at some future date, procure additional reserves,
by which that firm would increase market power in the EICP. The Court’s rejection of
these two pillars of the DOJ’s case severely weakened the legitimacy of the DOJ’s
arguments.
The significance of General Dynamics, however, does not rest in the successful rebuttals
of the DOJ’s ill-founded assumptions. The landmark decision that was handed down in
General Dynamics dealt primarily with the issue of how should a firm be judged when
that firm has substantial amounts of its production committed under long-term contracts.
Also, of equal importance is how should a firm be judged when that firm faces
diminishing levels of extractable resources. Considering both of these factors weakens
the market power and raises the legality of any merger among such firms, because the
firm’s (post-merger) contribution to concentration within the market is insignificant.
General Dynamics, in association with other cases brought before the courts, contributed
to a changing attitude towards the benefits of merger activity. The defendants involved in
FTC v National Tea Co. (1979) and U.S. v International Harvest Co. (1977) have
15
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maintained that market shares should be dropped entirely from the Court’s consideration
(Turner 1155).
By the 1980s, the move away from strict per se findings towards rulings based on a rule
of reason dominated the courts. Despite the DOJ’s retention of concentration analysis in
their 1982-84 Guidelines, the importance of such analysis had decreased precipitously
(Walters 224). The public statements of the Reagan Administration further reflected the
more amicable environment towards business (Waldman 124).
This paper has examined the Government’s case against General Dynamics. The errors in
defining the relevant geographic and product markets and their influence on calculating
market concentration have been observed. Also, the paper has provided an overview of
the investigation typical of functional analysis. This paper concludes by demonstrating
the durable effects of the General Dynamics decision on subsequent cases,
Further areas for research include an analysis of the effects General Dynamics has had on
antitrust law as well as antitrust theory; the development of new methods to delineate
geographic and product markets; the applicability of General Dynamics in current and
future court cases; and types of defenses that have been used to refute market share
standards.

Notes:
1: The Eastern Interior Coal Province (EICP) is cluster of states in the
Midwest that
are involved in the extraction and the production of coal. These states include Illinois,
Kentucky, Missouri, Indiana, Tennessee, Iowa, and Wisconsin.
2. During the latter portion of the 1960s and 1970s, the coal unions
became more
vocal and demanding both at the negotiating level and
at the political level. The
unions successfully lobbied the federal
government for the passage of the Federal
Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act. Throughout the 1970s, the unions won large
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wage increases from the coal companies for those workers primarily
far riskier extraction of underground reserves.

engaged in the

3: In 1969, the Federal Government, alarmed at the growing number of
fatalities in
deep-shaft mines, passed the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act. This Act
demanded that firms take precautions by
doing the following: 1) increased roof
bolting; 2) ventilation; and 3) rock dusting. The Act had two effects on the coal
industry.
Firstly, the Act created a new federal bureaucracy that hired many
persons then employed with coal companies. The technical abilities
of
these individuals were difficult for the coal companies to replace. Thus, the coal
industry witnessed a slight tightening in the labor markets. Secondly, labor productivity
of underground mining
suffered severe losses in part due to meeting the
requirements of the 1969 Act. Labor productivity fell throughout the 1970s from 13.76
in 1970 to 8.5 in 1975.
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